When they arrived in Sweden in December 2018, the Houthis (whose troops were facing a military attack) and the government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi were under increasing international pressure to reach an agreement. The final push came with the arrival of UN Secretary-General Anténio Guterres to the talks, last-minute phone calls from Mattis to senior Saudi and Emirati officials, and resulting pressure from Riyadh on the Hadi government to accept a compromise on Hodeida. In the end, the agreement was so hasty that the parties did not really sign it. [fn]»Making Yemen`s Hodeida Deal Stick,» Crisis Group Q-A, 19 December 2018.Hide Footnote They also left the deal`s language vague, especially in the section described the local security forces that were to control Hodeida once front-line forces redeployed. [fn]»Security of the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa will be the responsibility of local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law. Legal powers must be respected and all obstacles to the proper functioning of local state institutions, including supervisory authorities, are removed. «Agreement on the City of Hodeidah and Ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Isa,» UN Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen. See Appendix A. The government points to the terms «in accordance with Yemeni law» to argue that its forces are needed to provide security. For their part, the Houthis say (and the UN agrees) that it has always been understood that the agreement was aimed at averting a humanitarian catastrophe and not at resolving sovereignty issues. Crisis Group interviews, New York, Abu Dhabi, April-June 2019.Hide Footnote The first term was an «agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa,» which, first and for not, agreed to an «immediate cease-fire» and then a «mutual redeployment of forces» in these areas. The intention of the parties to take human rights into account when approving the Stockholm Agreement is essential. In view of the international crimes and widespread human rights violations that have been claimed by all parties, it is significant that, in supporting the Stockholm Agreement, the parties explicitly supported the «importance of dealing urgently» with regard to the «humanitarian situation» with regard to prisoners in Yemen and the basis of their agreement on «legal procedures and provisions» , in particular the conventions, principles and norms of international humanitarian law [and] human rights.»  The parties went so far as to involve the International Committee of the Red Cross in «ensuring respect for fundamental humanitarian principles and procedures» and to recognize that humanitarian considerations motivated the ceasefire and the redistribution of troops in Hodeidah. The Security Council approved the Stockholm Agreement in accordance with Resolution 2451 (2018). Prior to the Stockholm agreement, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned that the destruction of the port would have been a «low point» over which it would have been impossible to avoid massive loss of life due to famine. UNICEF has estimated that 300,000 children could starve to death if the port closes.